

DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 144 463

HE 009 249

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TITLE Unionism and Collective Bargaining in the Public
Institutions of Higher Education in Rhode Island.
PUB DATE 77
NOTE 73p.; Field project submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the certificate of advanced
graduate study, Rhode Island College

EDRS PRICE MF-\$0.83 HC-\$3.50 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS *Collective Bargaining; College Faculty; Employer
Employee Relationship; *Higher Education; Negotiation
Impasses; State Surveys; Teacher Attitudes; *Teacher
Militancy; *Teacher Strikes; Tenure; *Unions
IDENTIFIERS *Rhode Island

ABSTRACT

A survey was designed to investigate the impact of faculty unionism, militancy, and collective bargaining on the traditional patterns, relationships, and academic governance in the public colleges and universities in the state. There appears to be a diversity of opinion concerning the causes and impact of these faculty activities. A majority of the respondents favor unions and collective negotiation, and view the use of strikes as a legitimate form of sanction to achieve faculty aims. Yet a majority also voice some doubts and deep concerns about carrying out such a threat by withholding service. The adversary relationship of management and faculty unions is likely to force an end to traditional management practices of collegiality and the protection of the tenured. (MSE)

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Unionism and Collective Bargaining in
the Public Institutions of Higher
Education in Rhode Island

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By
Anthony Masi

A Field Project Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Certificate
of Advanced Graduate Study

in

The Department of Administration and Curriculum

Division of Graduate Studies

Rhode Island College

1977

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
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ABSTRACT

This study was designed to investigate the impact of faculty unionism, militancy, and collective bargaining on the traditional patterns, relationships, and academic governance in the public institutions of higher education in Rhode Island. A total of 135 members of both the academic and nonacademic sectors were polled concerning their perceptions and attitudes about unionism and its possible implication for future management-faculty negotiations. Ninety-one of the selected sample responded, representing a return rate of approximately sixty-eight per cent.

Although the study was not designed to replicate any previous study, the final results tend to replicate other results tabulated from similar data which had been collected in more extensive and nationally oriented studies. The overall data appear to indicate that there is a diversity of opinion concerning the causes and impact of faculty unionism, militancy, and collective bargaining as they relate to the public institutions of higher education in Rhode Island.

The study further attempts to identify those factors which are seen as contributing most to an impasse or strike situation, and which if altered or compromised could possibly provide a solution to an impending crisis. Included in the study are data tables and a recommended prenegotiation model which, hopefully, can serve as an aid to administrators and faculty-union representative in the collective bargaining process.

A majority of the respondents favor unions and collective negotiations and view the use of strike as a legitimate form of sanction to achieve faculty aims. Yet, a majority also have some doubts and deep concerns about carrying out such a threat and withholding service. An examination of these seemingly contradictory opinions reveals that both may be necessary to maintain a balance between the power of management and the adversary nature of unionism, and to allow the faculty to maintain the image of itself as professionals.

The adversary relationship of management and faculty unions is likely to force an end to traditional management practices of collegiality and the protection of the tenured. Unionization challenges management and aims to protect everyone within the bargaining unit. Unionism has become an important part of the campus structure, and as its successes become more obvious, its growth will be accelerated.

In summary, the responses reflect a need for management and faculty unions to seek rational answers to solve the most critical and divisive factors leading to impasse and/or strike. They also reflect a conviction that faculty unions are here to stay on the campuses of the public institutions of higher education in Rhode Island.

Acknowledgment

The writer of this study wishes to express his appreciation to Dr. Sidney B. Rollins for his assistance and to other members of the Department of Administration and Curriculum, Rhode Island College, for their encouragement; to Mr. Bernard Singleton of the NEARI for his assistance; to acknowledge my colleagues James Federico, Jr., Raymond Fontaine, and Thomas Whitfield for their suggestions, and in particular Dwight Decker for his help and guidance, and Michael Flynn for his help in computerizing the extensive and varied data compiled during the study; and finally my deepest appreciation is reserved for my beloved wife Lillian J. for her assistance and encouragement, without her patience and understanding this study would not have been completed.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION	1
Context of the Problem	1
Statement of the Problem	5
Purpose of the Project	5
Operational Definition of Terms and Variables	6
II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE	8
III. METHODS	15
Subjects	15
Variables Under Consideration	15
Procedures	16
IV. RESULTS	18
Findings	18
Discussions	21
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS	39
VI. BIBLIOGRAPHY	50
VII. APPENDICES	
Appendix A - Chart 1 Collective Negotiation Procedures	53
Appendix B - Letter Requesting Assistance	54
Appendix C - Confidential Questionnaire	55
Appendix D - Follow-up Letter of Assistance	61

LIST OF TABLES

1. Demographic Background of Respondents	19
2. Selected Factors Influencing Unionism and Militancy	24
3. Selected Factors Influencing Impasse and/or Strike	26
4. Selected Factors of Faculty Unionization on Academic Governance	27
5. Current Attitudes of Respondents Toward Unions	29
6. Perception of Respondents of Factors Influencing Unionism and Militancy in Per Cent	30
7. Perception of Respondents of Factors Influencing Impasse and/or Strike in Per Cent	32
8. Impact of Faculty Unionization on Academic Governance in Per Cent	35

I. Introduction

A. Context of the problem

In the last decade, nationally as well as in Rhode Island, faculty unions have gained an important place in higher education. Important academic governance decisions are being made externally at the negotiation table rather than by local faculty organizations. Collective bargaining has become an important part of the college campus structure.

Public school teachers are using economic action to improve their welfare. This is being manifested by increased militancy and expressed by both collective bargaining and the use of strike to reinforce demands for higher salary and job security.

Rhode Island State Law, under the provisions of the 1966 "School Teachers' Arbitration Act" (better known as the Michaelson Act), "Declares it to be the public policy of the State to accord certified public school teachers the right to organize, to be represented, to negotiate professionally, and to bargain on a collective basis" with authorized management representatives. However, the Act does not provide "the right to strike." An important function of the Act was to provide the means of establishing and maintaining the direction of academic unionization, and to ensure its smooth integration into the various school systems.

In the three public supported institutions of higher education in Rhode Island (the University of Rhode Island,

Rhode Island College, and Rhode Island Junior College) negotiations are conducted by faculty representatives and the Board of Regents. Although the "Michaelson Act" prohibits teacher strikes, a walkout did occur at Rhode Island Junior College (the first in public higher education in Rhode Island) in September 1975.

There is no indication that strikes will go away. Their intensity and frequency are bound to increase as more and more public academic institutions engage in collective bargaining. Along with community teacher organizations, state teacher organizations are pressing hard in state legislatures for statutory negotiation laws to force administrators and boards to recognize the duly elected organization and to negotiate with its staff representative.

Little more than a decade ago, most teachers felt that strikes were not in keeping with their professional role as educators. The thinking seems to have all but disappeared as a viable barrier to such action. Even though many teachers are reluctant to strike, the traumas once associated with such overt potential disruptive acts are gone.

The impact of a "threat to strike" or the power of an actual strike has been recognized by most members of the academic community, and the frequency of the success of such overt actions has not been overlooked by most teachers and administrators. Therefore, merely including a clause in a

state law making it illegal for teachers to strike is no assurance that such strikes will not occur.

The power accorded to faculty unions through collective negotiations is likely to continue to change traditional campus relationships, particularly in the area of administration and governance. While many responsibilities, in whole or in part, have been assumed by faculty unions (for many valid reasons), it does not do away with the traditional responsibility of the chief administrative officer to "keep his house in order," and continue to provide overall leadership through a successful program of internal review of his operations.

The chief administrator continues to have major responsibility to carry out the functions of business management in all areas of finance, accounting, and reporting, as well as maintaining the necessary means for surveillance of the system of internal control. In the event of a strike, the administrative team has the responsibility to keep schools open (AASA, Vol VI, 1975, p. iv), and to resort to court action, when authorized by state law, to mandate a return to work. In the Rhode Island Junior College strike issue, management did not choose to enforce this option.

While opinions have varied, those knowledgeable and involved in school contract negotiations seem to agree that some of the more pertinent reasons for the increase in teacher militancy and strike are:

1. economic issues (AASA, Vol. VI, 1975, p. 5).
2. local tradition of militant unionism (Providence Journal-Bulletin, September 20, 1975, p. 18).
3. working conditions (Grossman, 1976, p. 41).
4. the adversary positions of negotiators (Kemerer and Baldrige, 1975, pp. 3, 32).
5. increased competency of teachers (Perry, 1970, p. 14; see also Sentelle, a, 1972, p. 3).
6. influx of young teachers (Morgan, 1974, p. 4).
7. lack of effective collective bargaining laws (Providence Journal-Bulletin, October 1, 1975, p. 18).
8. the inability of the courts to enforce a "no-strike" law, and/or court imposed injunction on striking organizations to mandate their return to work or to the bargaining table for further talks (Treacy and Blake, 1974, p. 1; see also The Evening Bulletin, November 18, 1975, p. A20).
9. the lack of a clear-cut state policy about college campus governance and negotiations.

The repeated reluctance and failure of the 1976 Rhode Island General Assembly to act on teacher strike legislation, notwithstanding the recommendations of its own appointed commission which had conducted an in-depth study of teacher related strikes, is indicative of both the political aspect of the problem and the failure of many legislators to understand fully the impact of faculty unionization on academic

governance and faculty contract negotiations.

B. Statement of the Problem

Few things can be more disruptive to an academic community than the withholding of faculty service. The increasing proliferation and militant posture of teacher unions as well as the continuing adversarial relationship between management and faculty unions have been cause for wide-spread concern and anxiety.

This relationship has affected the traditional pattern of campus governance by introducing new contractual features, rules and regulations, and increased bureaucratization to college campuses. In addition, it has brought about a major realignment of power blocks in college governance. Attention of the public sector has been focused on the apparent inadequacies of the existing collective bargaining structures. Hence, a major problem facing communities involved in school contract negotiations is the need to arrive at a speedy and rational settlement so as to minimize and/or eliminate the more corrosive consequences of strikes upon the educational process.

C. Purpose of the Project

The purpose of this study is 1) to investigate the impact of unionism and collective bargaining on the traditional patterns and relationship of academic governance in the public institutions of higher education in Rhode Island, 2) to examine pertinent issues and variables involved in collective

bargaining, 3) to identify those issues which could conceivably lead to, or result in, impasse or strike, and 4) to identify the relationship, if any, between selected issues and variables and the characteristics of the three institutions under study.

In summary, this study will examine academic governance and unionization on the campuses of the three state-supported institutions of higher education in Rhode Island, and seek the answers to 1) Why teachers feel the need for collective bargaining, 2) Why the traditional system of academic governance is no longer acceptable to faculty, 3) Why the drive to unionize is meeting with success, 4) Why teacher militancy has increased, and 5) How the power structure between management and faculty has changed since unionization.

D. Operational Definition of Terms and Variables

1. Collective Bargaining - A central feature of labor-management relations. It provides an established process through which representatives of employees (faculty) and of employers (management) bargain collectively to agree on the terms of a negotiated labor contract. Viewed by faculty members as an effective mechanism to achieve faculty goals, resolve existing problems, reassert faculty authority, and to correct an imbalance of power.

2. Impasse - A breakdown of negotiation because of a failure at the bargaining table. A deadlock, usually due to

the refusal of one or both parties to compromise reach an agreement, or resolve a dispute related to conditions of employment. Frequently resolved by mediation, factfinding, or arbitration.

3. Militancy - Reflected by an aggressive attitude and a strong determination to attain objectives. Manifested by a willingness to question and defy administrative and judicial authority, and, if necessary, to support union officials' decision to strike. Often generated by dissatisfaction, restlessness, and/or frustrations against an arrogant and insensitive management which refuses to relinquish some power.

II. Review of the Literature

The 1970s continue to remain a period of economic crises for most of the industrialized world. In the United States, the economic downturn has strongly influenced academic communities, particularly those involved in public education, and has resulted in thousands of qualified people being either under employed or unemployed (Kemerer and Baldrige, 1975, p. 4).

As a means of protecting their interests, faculties are turning to collective bargaining, and are establishing or joining viable unions for added protection. In its 1967 case study of college campuses, the American Association For Higher Education pointed out that many college professors have disregarded existing notions of propriety and have joined unions in significant numbers and pressed for formal negotiations with the administration, and that while the dramatic developments caused by the changing role and rights of professors cannot be measured with scientific precision, it is apparent that faculty unrest and demands for greater representation in academic governance have reached significant dimensions. The report also suggests that the greatest discontent and most visible tendencies toward unionization are found at the junior college level (p. 5).

Much has been written about faculty militancy and unionism on college campuses, and while there is no general agreement as to cause and effect, most focus on four main issues;

salaries, job security, working conditions, and grievance procedures.

Sentelle (1972 a) interprets the current literature as being characterized by a paucity of basic research and a plethora of opinion. However, he does concede that part of the difficulty stems from the abstract nature of the subject itself, and that while current opinions remain essentially unsubstantiated by research, most observers believe that teacher militancy can be classified into two major groups. The first category includes economic reasons, and the second relates to changes in working conditions and to the make-up of the teaching profession (p. 1).

In commenting on the past studies of Kasper (1970), Thornton (1971), Baird and Landon (1972), and Hall and Carrol (1973), Treacy and Blake (1974, p. 2) caution that such works, because of their narrow focus or types of samples used, be treated with caution. Kemerer and Baldrige (1975, pp. ix-x) conclude that most books which are currently available contain little on the impact of unions on academic governance.

The recent increase in teacher militancy and aggressive drive for collective organization is interpreted by Perry (1970, p. 13) as a desire for more money and benefits, and for a "higher share of the pie." He credits legislation granting collective bargaining rights as a crucial cause and effect of teacher militancy. Kemerer and Baldrige believe that a major factor in shaping collective bargaining is the

scope of collective bargaining that is allowed. They also say that in the short time that faculty unions have been representing faculty, great gains have been made in academic governance, particularly in the area of personnel policies.

In commenting on academic governance and collective bargaining, Kemerer and Baldrige view both as political processes. They see academic governance as a complex dynamic by which divergent interest groups try to gain their objectives, and collective bargaining as designed to provide ever-increasing benefits for union members who, in turn, keep union leaders in office. They do not believe that unions, in their drive for added power and control, will decrease their demands for negotiation of nonmandatory issues at the bargaining table.

Sentelle (1972 b, p. 8) on the basis of known investigations, concludes that the decisive issues creating strike situations are 1) the fiscal dependence of the Boards of Education on other governmental bodies, which in turn reduces the flexibility of a Board to deal with the problems at hand, 2) breakdown of communication between teachers and administrators, and 3) refusal of management to allow faculty involvement in policy determination and decision making.

Another interesting observation Sentelle (1972 c, p. 13) makes is that teacher strikes, as a rule, find school management usually unprepared in terms of information and experience to deal with the crisis. Management, he feels, tends to underestimate the seriousness of the warning signals which

precede a strike, and that many school officials are seriously deficient in their lack of awareness, sophistication, and realism in dealing with young militant teachers. He sees a definite relationship between a poor tax structure to support education and strike situations, and points out that most collective bargaining issues are closely related to a demand for increased salary. Teacher groups, in his estimation, are not usually deterred from their demands by legal deadlines for budgets (1972 c, p. 11).

Wilson (1972, p. 18) states that in addition to the main concern of teachers to improve salary and working conditions is the desire to be involved in decisions that concern them. He contends that administrators will need more than knowledge of why teachers unionize if they are to resolve the problem relating to collective bargaining. He sees the important questions as: what is to be negotiated? how to get ready for negotiation? And, what can the administrator negotiate in a situation where he/she is responsible to an elective board?

While Ohm (1966) maintains that the emergence of faculty collective bargaining and the conflicts generated by their activities have been brought about by the teachers' desire for professionalism, the American Association For Higher Education study concludes that professionalism is no more than a polite fiction in many academic institutions. Ohm further believes that an increase in power and control by faculty unions does

not mean a decrease in the power and control of either administrators or Boards of Education.

Channing, Steiner, and Timmerman (1973) in their study of trustees at several community colleges discuss shared authority. They contend that decisions once the prerogative of the college president are now being shared with trustees because of the concentration of collective bargaining on economic issues: an area of trustee expertise.

A more recent study on "shared authority" is Decker's (1975) investigation of varied educational roles at Rhode Island Junior College. Decker visualizes a tri-partite concept of "shared authority" consisting of faculty, administration, and the Board of Regents in which under certain conditions the faculty would have equal voting status with administration. Administration would continue to have final authority (with faculty advice) in other specific areas. He also sees the Board of Regents controlling long range institutional planning and the building of new facilities with input from faculty and administration.

Decker also reflects the views of Keppel (1969) who advocates a call for cooperative effort and action by administrators and other concerned groups at the federal and local levels to share authority in the development of educational policy. Keppel sees this procedure as producing much needed checks and balances to the educational system while also maintaining meaningful standards. Epstein (1965) believes that

agreement should be by consensus and not solely by administrative decisions, and that common goals, open communication and material respect are vital to this process. And Selden (1967) pictures unions as having a unique role in educational policy by offering solutions to problems without prior commitment to vested interests or inadequate programs.

In summary, the literature reveals that much relating to collective bargaining is happening in higher education. The reasons for this trend are complex, as revealed by the divergence of opinion concerning faculty unionism. They include:

- 1) faculty discontent which has become more and more evident in institutions of higher learning in the United States, 2) the accelerated unionization of faculty members of public institutions, 3) the concentration of unionized institutions in states with laws favoring collective bargaining for public employees, and 4) the expenditure of large sums of money by major national unions to organize higher education.

The actions of the major unions can be seen in (a) the nearly two million dollars, budgeted in 1975, by the National Education Association (NEA) for unionizing faculty, (b) the top priority given to organizing higher education by the American Federation of Teachers (AFT), an AFL-CIO affiliate, and (c) the commitment of increased resources by the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), the most conservative and traditional of faculty organizations, to organize the faculty of higher education. In Rhode Island, the three

organizations represent the Rhode Island Junior College, Rhode Island College, and the University of Rhode Island respectively.

Endorsement of the principle of faculty representation, by itself, will have little impact on campus governance and administration. To be effective, this statement of principle must be supported by the establishment of formal organizational arrangements designed to involve faculty in decision making in key substantive areas. If faculty are to maintain their relative position vis-a-vis other public employees, then they must present a comparable degree of organization and determination in the legislation (National Society of Professors, Feb/Mar. 1971, p. 8).

The divergence of opinions concerning the cause and impact of faculty unionism, militancy, and collective bargaining in higher education, and the 1975 work stoppage at Rhode Island Junior College are the major reasons why this investigator was motivated to study their impact on the three public institutions of higher education in Rhode Island.

III. Methods

A. Subjects

The subjects of the study were selected to ensure a representative cross section of personnel involved in academic management-union contracts, and of persons concerned with the development and implementation of educational policies. The sample included faculty (60 per cent), administrators (38 per cent), and nonacademic personnel (11 per cent), i.e. members of the Board of Regents, the judiciary, and the legislature.

The sample initially totalled 135 individuals. Nearly 68 per cent of the sample responded. Sixty-three responses were received on the first return. Twenty-eight additional returns were received as a result of a follow-up letter (see Appendix D). Each respondent was asked to complete a questionnaire (see Appendix B), containing pertinent questions and statements relating to the specific areas discussed in this study. The contents of the questionnaire were based on information gathered from the search of literature and from recommendations of peers, administrators, and union officials.

B. Variables Under Consideration

Variables that were considered are age, sex, position, degree held, and type of institution. Due to the nature of the study, the listed variables were beyond the control and/or manipulation of this investigator.

C. Procedures

The items for the questionnaire were developed from the literature in the field of campus unionization and collective bargaining, from the suggestions of academic peers, and from other professionals concerned with faculty-management negotiations. The respondents were selected on the basis of the individual's name from the top, middle, or bottom of campus telephone directories or of organizational listings that were provided for the investigator's use.

Respondents were asked to complete the questionnaire (see Appendix C). Because of the diversity of the sample and the design of the questionnaire, some questions were not pertinent to all respondents. As a result, total responses reflected in the accompanying tables are not consistent. The questionnaire, exclusive of the demographic portion of the survey instrument consists of approximately seventy-four items.

The questionnaire was designed to consider those factors which the search of literature revealed contributed most to creating either strikes or potential strike situations, and to identify, if possible, the common characteristics of impasse and strike. Respondents were asked to indicate their opinion by using the following number code in filling in the blank space to the left of each item:

1. Strongly Agree
2. Agree with Reservation

3. Strongly Disagree
4. Disagree with Reservation
5. No Opinion

The questionnaire items were categorized in four major areas:

1. Campus Unionization and Militancy
2. Factors Leading to Impasse and/or Strike
3. Impact of Faculty Unionization on Academic Governance
4. Current Attitudes

To encourage additional, frank personal comments, respondents were cautioned not to sign the questionnaire so as to ensure anonymity (see letter Appendix B).

IV. Results

A. Findings

The results of the survey reflect a changing professional environment on the campuses of the state-supported colleges in Rhode Island, particularly at the two year college level, where a 1975 confrontation between faculty-union and management resulted in the first strike at the public college level in Rhode Island. A major problem faced by public college administrators is that they must appease such diverse groups as the Board of Regents, the college faculty, the administrative hierarchy, and students.

The selected and detailed computations of respondents' answers are shown in tabular form on the subsequent pages. Table 1 focuses on demographic data, Table 2 reflects the impact of factors which have greatly influenced campus-unionism and militancy, Table 3 identifies the factors which tend to influence both impasse and strike, Table 4 clearly shows the impact of faculty unionization on academic governance, and Table 5 reveals the current attitude of the selected sample about unionism on their respective campuses.

While the above tables focus on selected factors, Tables 6, 7, and 8 reflect the consolidated results of the responses from the selected sample as they pertain to: 1) "Perception of Respondents of Factors Influencing Unionism" (Table 6), 2) "Perception of Respondents of Factors Influencing Impasse

Table 1
Demographic Background of Respondents

AGE	UNDER 30				UNDER 40				UNDER 50				OVER 50			
SCHOOL	a	b	c	d	a	b	c	d	a	b	c	d	a	b	c	d
POSITION (Faculty)																
Professor				1	3	3			1	1			3	3	1	
Assoc. Prof.	1				3	3	3	1			4	2			6	
Ass't. Prof.		1	2	1	3	3	6		1	1	3				1	
Instructor	4	4	2	2				1				1				4
Other			2	2				4				1			1	2
DEGREE EARNED																
Bachelor or Less	1	1	1					1							1	1
Masters	4	4	3	1	1	1	6	1	1	1	5	1			5	1
Above Masters			2	3	8	8	3	4	1	1	2	3	3	3	2	3
Other				1											1	1
VOTE FOR UNION																
In Favor	3	3	4	4	9	5	9	5	2	2	7	2	2	2	5	3
Not in Favor or no comment	2	2	2	2		4		1				2	1	1	4	3

^aUniversity of Rhode Island. ^bRhode Island College. ^cRhode Island Junior College. ^dOther.

and/or Strike" (Table 7), and 3) "Impact of Faculty Unionism on Academic Governance" (Table 8).

A majority of the selected sample feel that the major factors which have greatly influenced unionism, militancy, and strike, and have led to serious confrontation with management, are faculty (a) desire for increased benefits, 95 per cent, (b) desire to negotiate job security, 89 per cent, (c) desire for increased power, 87 per cent, (d) desire to preserve economic power and job, 86 per cent, (e) determination to bargain collectively, 80 per cent, (f) fear of budget cuts, 74 per cent, and (g) concern for working conditions, 65 per cent. Two other factors seen by respondents as important areas of discontent are (h) limited faculty role in academic governance, 71 per cent, and (i) freezing of aid to education 67 per cent (see Table 2).

In response to other questions about the growth and strength of unions on campus, the views of the respondents struck a more consistent pattern. The most important, reflected in both Tables 2 and 3, include: (a) favorable state and federal collective bargaining laws, 71 per cent, (b) influx of young aggressive teachers, 66 per cent, (c) influence of state and national affiliates, 64 per cent, (d) changing attitudes about withholding services, 69 per cent, and (e) ineffective (weak) labor laws, 64 per cent.

B. Discussion

In probing for reasons for the accelerated growth of campus unions and of faculty collective bargaining, most studies according to Kemerer and Baldrige are no more than "edited collection of papers" full of facts with little emphasis on consequences, and lack "overall integration" (pp. ix, x).

This present study is based on the most complete set of data collected to date on faculty unionization and collective bargaining in the public institutions of higher education in Rhode Island. It goes further than mere factual reporting about campus unionization, and attempts to deal with the implications and consequences of faculty unionism on the three institutions under study. The results of this study both support and refute some of the data and conclusions to be found in the researched literature.

This survey has attempted to identify those factors which have contributed most to an impasse or strike situation, and which, if altered or compromised, might possibly provide a solution to an impending crisis. It is believed that meaningful conclusions about the causes and consequences of unionism, militancy, and collective bargaining can be made from the accumulated survey data.

The fundamental question is no longer the acceptance of unionism on the three public campuses, but rather the continued protection of the rights and privileges achieved

through collective action. The majority of the faculty no longer believe that their newly won gains can be protected by tradition alone. This feeling is shared by 61 per cent of the respondents who saw a need for collective action because they not only lacked faith in tradition, but also confidence in the unilateral practice of administrators (see questions 1.15 and 1.23, Appendix C).

The trend toward faculty collective bargaining appears to be shaped by such determinants as weak faculty representation (senates and concourses), concerns over job security, salary, working conditions, and the determination to bargain collectively. It is interesting to note that the faculty concourse at Rhode Island Junior College is no longer a viable body and for all practical purposes is nonexistent.

Faculty unions seem to appeal to those who, like their skilled counterparts in the industrial sector, have realized that without a collective effort, reinforced and influenced by the support of a collective bargaining agent, maintaining newly acquired rights and privileges would be difficult.

In sum, academic unionism is a major factor, and will continue to be in the governance of the three public institutions of higher education in Rhode Island. What its long range impact will be on these institutions and their academic goals is difficult to predict.

The concerns which emerge from the responses of the

selected sample are reflected in several of the accompanying tables. In general, the drive to organize seems to disclose a desire for protection against mounting external pressures and a deep and genuine concern over the question of internal academic governance. Faculty desire to influence governance is a critical factor in faculty unionization. More than seven out of ten respondents see collective action as a way to halt the concentration of power in the hands of administrators and as a defense against external forces (see Table 2).

Kemerer and Baldridge state that faculty view and support campus unionism "as a weapon against economy-minded legislators and trustees who insist upon cost reductions and improve accountability" (p. 222). This view was strongly supported by a majority of the selected sample which believed that "Fear of budget cuts" (74 per cent), and the "Freezing of aid to education" (67 per cent) were factors influencing unionism (see Table 2). The responses to these two questions may have been the result of a reaction against Governor Noel's decree in 1975 of a drastic cut in Rhode Island State appropriation and a freezing of aid to education.

As the priority of public funds is revised or becomes concentrated in nonacademic areas, unionization can help protect the faculty (as it did in forcing a change to the freezing of aid to education) from the arbitrary decisions of state officials acting on the basis of external economic pressure.

Table 2

Selected Factors Influencing Unionism and Militancy¹

Questions	Per cent Agreeing ²
1.1 Desire for increased benefits	95
1.2 Fear of budget cut	74
1.3 Desire to negotiate job security	89
1.5 Influx of young aggressive teachers	66
1.8 Administrative decisions over personnel	66
1.9 Desire for more say in academic governance	71
1.12 Organizing efforts of State/National affiliates	64
1.13 Desire to preserve economic power and job	86
1.15 Need of teachers to resort to collective action	60
1.17 Favorable labor laws - State/Federal	71
1.19 Freezing of aid to education	67
1.22 Working conditions	65
1.24 Ineffectiveness of Faculty Senate, Concourse, etc.	59
1.27 Strikes no longer viewed as non-professional	69
1.28 Refusal of management to share authority	60
1.30 Guidance and help from local union officials	60
1.31 Determination of faculty to bargain collectively	80

¹Selected questions, see Table 6 for tabulated results (in per cent) of respondents answers to all questions.

²Strongly Agree and Agree With Reservation are combined as are Strongly Disagree and Disagree With Reservation.

The political pressure exerted by the collective bargaining agencies representing the faculty of the three institutions was a major factor in the subsequent modification of the governor's position to hold to a fixed budget.

In reacting to questions relating to responsibility and authority (see Table 3), and power (see Table 4) 68 per cent are of the opinion that faculty should assume responsibility for academic governance, while 40 per cent of the respondents felt that administrators should have ultimate authority. An overwhelming majority (84 per cent) felt that faculty unionism has increased the power of the faculty in academic governance, while approximately seven out of ten respondents felt that faculty unionism has decreased the power of management.

In responding to statements pertaining to the impact of off-campus organizations on academic governance (see Table 3), less than 40 per cent were of the opinion that union officials are infringing on the rights and/or responsibilities of the faculty. However, 59 per cent believe that court injunctions mandating a return to work are legitimate and should be enforced, possibly implying that the courts should take a more critical stand regarding teacher-management labor disputes.

Neal (1971, p. 73) views the injunction "as a weakening protection for school administrators, because there appears to be a growing hesitation for judges to issue injunctions against teacher strikes automatically."

Table 3

26

Selected Factors Influencing Impasse and/or Strike¹

Questions	Per cent Agreeing ²
2.1 Anti-strike injunctions reinforce strike sentiment	68
2.2 Rejection of salary increase demands	96
2.4 Restraints on negotiating budget matters	76
2.5 Ineffective labor laws	64
2.7 Fear of faculty retrenchment	78
2.9 Lack of specific issues to negotiate	60
2.12 Lack of legislative action to impose equal penalties	61
2.13 Administrators should have ultimate authority	40
2.14 Faculty should set academic policies and standards	68
2.15 Faculty rights and responsibilities surrendered to union officials, organizers, etc.	39
2.16 Educational taxes should be fixed by State law	37
2.17 State should assume full cost of education	39
2.18 Withholding of faculty services violates professional values	44
2.19 Court injunctions should be enforced	59
2.21 A permanent prenegotiation committee should be established	67
2.22 Collective negotiation (early start)	90
2.23 Collective negotiation (150 days before budget date)	75
2.24 Continuous negotiation (no disruption/strike)	61
2.25 Resort to binding arbitration (third party neutral)	68
2.26 Resort to mandatory mediation (third party decision)	57
2.28 Last best offer "item by item" (third party decision)	31
2.29 Fiscal responsibility given to independent agency	33

¹Selected questions, see Table 7 for tabulated results (in per cent) of respondents' answers to all questions.

²Strongly Agree and Agree with Reservation are combined as are Strongly Disagree and Disagree with Reservation

Table 4
Impact of Faculty Unionization on Academic Governance

Questions	Per Cent Agreeing ¹
3.1 Increased the power of faculty	81
3.2 Decreased the power of management	72
3.3 Eliminates concept of collegiality	48
3.4 Increases independence of faculty	68
3.5 Formalizes relations between faculty and management	79
3.6 Enhances faculty freedom	63
3.7 Not changed power relationship	30
3.8 Protects unproductive and mediocre faculty	54
3.9 Increases power of State agencies	34
3.10 Formalizes faculty relationships, etc.	60
3.11 Caused faculty to lose status with public	40
3.12 Enhanced faculty relationship with students	41

¹Agree Strongly and Agree with Reservation are combined as are Disagree Strongly and Disagree with Reservation.

In a recent important court decision, Mr. Justice Kelleher of the Rhode Island Supreme Court (Westerly School Committee vs. Teachers Association, 111 R.I. 104) pointed out that the judiciary should be careful about issuing injunctions so that it would not become an unwitting third party at the bargaining table and a potential coercive force in the collective bargaining process. He concluded that the court is neither a mediator or conciliator of labor disputes (The NEARI Journal, January 1977, p. 1).

While the courts may continue to provide an effective opposition to local union officials, "third party arbitration is an aspect of faculty unionism which might prove a strong challenge to local administrative authority," because of ambiguous contract language. The language is often so vague that the contract at a later date may be interpreted to the detriment of the administrators (Kemerer and Baldrige, p. 194). In response to a question about third party arbitration, approximately seven out of ten respondents indicated a preference for resorting to a third party (neutral) to resolve an impasse situation (see Table 3).

Faculty responses to the questions dealing with voluntary mediation seem to be highly favorable to this form of collective negotiation. Sixty-one per cent of the selected sample preferred to continue negotiations rather than conduct a work-stoppage in the event of an impasse (see Table 3). These figures are significant and can possibly be interpreted to mean

Table 5
Current Attitudes of Respondents Toward Unions

	Per cent ¹
Section IV - Vote for unionization	
1. Voted for a union	75
2. Voted against all unions	15
3. Abstained	8
4. No response to specific question	2
Section V - Vote for type of representation	
1. Voted for System-wide representation, one agency	10
2. Voted for unified representation, three agencies	6
3. Voted for representation by AAUP-AFT	0
4. Voted for representation by AAUP-NEA	4
5. Voted for representation by NEA-AFT	3
6. Voted for no change	61
7. No response to specific question	16

¹Agree Strongly and Agree with Reservation are combined as are Disagree Strongly and Disagree with Reservation.

Table 6¹

Perception of Respondents of Factors Influencing Unionism and Militancy in Per Cent.

Question No. ²	Per Cent ³ Agreeing	Per Cent ⁴ Disagreeing	Question No.	Per Cent Agreeing	Per Cent Disagreeing
1.1	95	5	1.17	71	21
1.2	74	19	1.18	54	29
1.3	89	6	1.19	67	21
1.4	45	45	1.20	42	40
1.5	66	27	1.21	43	40
1.6	51	30	1.22	65	32
1.7	42	45	1.23	61	22
1.8	66	29	1.24	59	21
1.9	71	24	1.25	50	33
1.10	55	30	1.26	55	35
1.11	48	38	1.27	69	28
1.12	64	29	1.28	60	35
1.13	86	9	1.29	60	33
1.14	57	22	1.30	39	49
1.15	60	34	1.31	80	13
1.16	37	51			

¹See Table 2 for tabulated results to selected questions.²See Appendix C, Section I for list of specific questions.³Strongly Agree and Agree with Reservation are combined.⁴Strongly Disagree and Disagree with Reservation are combined.

that a majority of the selected sample are somewhat reluctant about withholding services.

A further analysis of responses to questions relating to mandatory mediation reveals that some division exists among the respondents. While 57 per cent agree to mandatory mediation and the acceptance of a third party decision, 59 per cent oppose the idea of resorting to the last best offer "total package" (third party decision), and 52 per cent oppose the idea of a last best offer "item by item" (third party decision), (see questions 2.26, 2.27, and 2.28, Table 7).

Three of the most interesting findings, and contrary to expectations, were those relating to tax questions, assigning responsibility for educational costs to the state (see questions 2.16, 2.17, and 2.29, Table 7). Less than 40 per cent agreed with the basic idea. The tabulated results reveal: (a) 37 per cent believe that a tax for education should be fixed by state law, (b) 39 per cent feel that the state should assume the full cost of education, and (c) 33 per cent would be willing to give an independent (autonomous) state agency the authority to adjust (fix) tax rates for educational purposes.

It is interesting to note that in March 1976, Governor Noel submitted a legislative package ("50-50" plan) for school finance. The governor stated that the bill, if enacted, "will totally reform the tax system as we know it today" (The Evening Bulletin, March 25, 1976, p. 1). The legislative bill

Table 7¹

Perception of Respondents of Factors Influencing Impasse and/or Strike in Per Cent

Question No. ²	Per Cent ³ Agreeing	Per Cent ⁴ Disagreeing	Question No.	Per Cent Agreeing	Per Cent Disagreeing
2.1	68	23	2.16	37	28
2.2	86	9	2.17	39	38
2.3	87	8	2.18	44	41
2.4	76	17	2.19	59	35
2.5	64	27	2.20	39	49
2.6	78	12	2.21	67	25
2.7	78	14	2.22	90	5
2.8	53	28	2.23	75	7
2.9	60	27	2.24	61	34
2.10	57	31	2.25	68	22
2.11	46	47	2.26	57	30
2.12	61	31	2.27	31	59
2.13	39	56	2.28	34	52
2.14	68	28	2.29	33	32
2.15	39	56			

¹See Table 3 for tabulated results to selected questions.

²See Appendix C, Section II for list of specific questions.

³Strongly Agree and Agree with Reservation are combined.

⁴Strongly Disagree and Disagree with Reservation are combined

did not pass because the lawmakers feared both higher state-taxes and strong vocal protests by taxpayers.

The unfavorable attitude of the selected sample and the lack of success in passing new tax legislation is indicative of a belief and/or desire that the financing of elementary and secondary education remain a local matter, and the procedure for financing higher education not be changed. If this attitude will continue to persist under changing economic conditions, and as the squeeze for the tax dollar becomes more acute, remains to be seen.

In summary, whether the average faculty member will continue to reap the preliminary advantages —economic benefits and job security— of campus unionization in the future will depend a great deal upon the composition of the three institutions of higher education in Rhode Island, the characteristics of the top school administrators, of union officials, and of public officials. More importantly, it will depend upon the ability of union leaders and officials to dialogue and bargain as effectively and successfully against a new breed of administrators and academic management personnel who are becoming more adept at collective bargaining.

In the past, school administrators and their representatives, possessing only a rudimentary grasp of basic negotiation concepts, have been forced to bargain with experienced union officials and hardened veterans of the negotiation

process. The outcome has not been a happy one for either management, taxpayer, or student.

As the data and responses reveal, campus unionism is a permanent aspect of higher education in Rhode Island and has been accepted by the majority of faculty members as the only practical alternative to protect the interests of union members and to bring about needed changes in education.

Kemerer and Baldrige believe that another important factor influencing campus unionization is the "growing acceptance of unions in public employment throughout the country." Faculty unions, they contend, "because of their success are no longer a novelty" (p. 49). Among the more negative aspects of unionism, as indicated by the selected sample, are: (a) loss of collegiality, (b) increased formal relationship between management and faculty, and (c) an increased feeling of antagonism among some members of the faculty (see Tables 4 and 8).

The selected sample was asked to react to a statement concerning current attitude toward unionism. The tabulated results are reflected in both Table 1 and Table 5. While an overwhelming majority of the sample (almost 75 per cent) favored unionism on campus, the degree of support varied between age groups. The most supportive (about 75 per cent) were between the ages of 31 and 50. The least supportive (57 per cent), and, not surprisingly, holding the highest faculty positions, were those in the age group over 50. However, in terms of educational attainment, there appear to be no

Table 8¹

Impact of Faculty Unionization on Academic Governance in Per Cent

Question No. ²	Per Cent ³ Agreeing	Per Cent ⁴ Disagreeing
3.1	81	16
3.2	72	21
3.3	48	49
3.4	68	25
3.5	79	16
3.6	63	28
3.7	30	66
3.8	54	31
3.9	34	53
3.10	60	25
3.11	40	33
3.12	41	46

¹See Table 4 for tabulated results to selected questions.

²See Appendix C, Section III for list of specific questions.

³Strongly Agree and Agree with Reservation are combined.

⁴Strongly Disagree and Disagree with Reservation are combined.

significant difference between the support of unionism by those holding professional or doctorate degrees and those holding lesser degrees (see Table 1).

The respondents rejected by an overwhelming majority the ideas of 1) a system-wide representation by one bargaining agency, ten per cent voted approval, 2) a unified three agency representation, only six per cent approved, and 3) a joint representation of two of the three bargaining agencies which had an approval rate of seven per cent. While four per cent of the selected sample were willing to accept a joint representation of AAUP and NEA, and three per cent voted for a joint representation of NEA and AFT, none of the respondents favored a joint representation of AAUP and AFT (see Table 5).

While the current attitude of the selected sample may be strongly opposed to any affiliation of faculty bargaining agencies, this attitude is not shared by the governing officials of NEA. Mr. John Ryor, president of NEA, has officially proposed a "National Alliance in Higher Education" that would pool the strength of NEA with that of AAUP. The NEA officials believe that since the philosophic orientation of NEA and AAUP is similar, they see the proposed alliance (not merger) working to the advantage of all educators of higher education, and to the mutual benefit of all concerned.

Ryor also sees it as "optimizing the combined strength of the two organizations" (NEA Advocate, January 1977, pp. 1-3). How successful Mr. Ryor and the other governing officials of

NEA will be, remains to be seen. However, if the attitude of the national membership of the NEA and the AAUP approximates that of the selected sample of this study, the NEA proposal faces a doubtful future.

In summary, the trend and success of collective bargaining and unionism on the three public campuses of Rhode Island appear to be shaped by varied factors. Included among these are: (a) the desire to influence academic governance, (b) the concern for job security, (c) the desire to improve working conditions, (d) concern over the ineffectiveness of weak faculty representation by internal organizations and the need for more effective collective action through an external source, (e) the need to bargain collectively for increased economic benefits, (f) the strong support of union members, regardless of age and position, for union policies and decisions, and (g) the determination of union leaders at the national level to enhance the power of their affiliates by seeking affiliation with other nationally oriented faculty unions.

In addition, faculty members of the three public colleges have apparently reached the conclusion that traditional faculty-management relationship, or that traditional policies alone, will no longer protect their rights and interests within their respective institutions. Therefore, a trend that can no longer be ignored is the change in attitude

about the nonprofessionalism of teacher strikes. Sixty-nine per cent of the selected sample do not see such action as nonprofessional (see Table 2). Since such action is "no longer a novelty" (Kemerer and Baldrige, p. 49), it is assumed that this feeling will continue to spread among college faculty when economic benefits are contrasted with the loss of an abstract professional image.

V. Summary and Conclusion

This study has attempted to go beyond merely reporting the facts about the growth and success of unionism on the three public campuses of higher education in Rhode Island. It was not the intention of this investigator to replicate previous studies on unionism in higher education. However, the final results, tabulated from survey data received from the selected sample, generally replicate results tabulated from similar data collected in more extensive or nationally oriented surveys on campus unionism.

One such study by Kemerer and Baldridge, Union on Campus, was published in late 1975. It began as the Stanford Project on Academic Governance in 1971 and was completed in 1974. The survey was sponsored by the Stanford Center for Research and Development in Teaching, and financed by the National Institute of Education (pp. vii-viii). Because of its extensive research and documentation, and its emphasis on the consequences of college unionism, it is considered one of the most comprehensive studies, to date, of faculty unionism on a national scale.

The nationally oriented study of Kemerer and Baldridge, also referred to as the 1974 Stanford Study, and the locally oriented study of this investigator, reveal a unionization pattern that is common to both the local and national level. It is a pattern that has been developing for many years and which can be found primarily rooted in economic concerns

and job security fears. Further comparisons between the two studies are discussed below.

The catalysts to the growth of faculty unions at the three public institutions have been the organizing efforts of the local and national teacher organizations and the changing collective bargaining laws permitting public employees to bargain collectively. While each of the three public institutions is represented by a different agent, the common factors facing union membership "forces the different agents to follow similar patterns at the bargaining table, regardless of affiliation" (Kemerer and Baldrige, p. 107).

In terms of importance, wages, job security, and determination for collective action are clearly rated as major reasons for both unionization and possible causes leading to impasse or strike.

Although teachers are concerned about professional image, such concerns play an insignificant part when economic benefits and job security are at stake. A 1969 Carnegie Commission sample of 60,028 faculty members reveals that 45 per cent of those polled acknowledged that a strike might be legitimate under some circumstances. A more recent study of the Pennsylvania State System (Lozier, 1974) found a definite correlation between the attitudes of teachers and the official position of their teacher organization.

The 1974 Stanford study shows that 80 per cent of the union chairpersons responding agreed that "the strike is a

legitimate tactic for faculties to use in bargaining" (Kemerer and Baldrige, p. 106). The reaction of the selected sample to a related question (see question 1.27, Table 2), reveals that 69 per cent of those responding are sympathetic to a strike and no longer view it as a nonprofessional action. When a faculty member feels threatened by any action of management, he/she will look to and expect strong union support to counteract any change affecting the faculty interest or well-being.

When a contract is signed and ratified by union membership, the reduced flexibility of administrative authority does bring about some constructive changes, i. e., (a) both parties are compelled to bargain in good faith, (b) it forces the administration to share information that has been formerly withheld, (c) it alerts management to the fact that "free and candid exchange of fiscal information is absolutely essential during the bargaining process" (McHugh, 1972, see also Kemerer and Baldrige, pp. 191-92), and (d) it brings about a democratization of influence and power among a larger number of faculty members.

There is no simple answer or solution when contracting parties are faced with impasse or strike. Turning to more restrictive legislation, or attempting to achieve education through judicial decision or injunction, is not in the best interest of the academic community, and in particular of students. Antistrike injunctions are seen by union members as

reflecting the willingness of management to use the power of the state to restrict the power of unions. Sixty-eight per cent of the respondents feel that such actions only serve to reinforce strike sentiment (see Table 3).

Although the strike is a weapon of last resort, there are no persuasive reasons to deny teacher organizations the right to use this sanction when justified (see Chart 1, Appendix A). Mr. Henry J. Nardone, a member of the Rhode Island Board of Regents, views the idea of the "right to strike as unique" (Rollins, 1976, pp. 6-7).

Faculty strikes, contrary to accepted beliefs (more imaginary than factual), will result in the retention of less competent teachers and the exodus of more competent faculty is not supported, factually, by either the search of literature or this study.

Injunctions, mandating the return of union members to work, have proved of questionable worth, even in the face of a jail sentence. In view of union alternatives, it would be in the public's best interest to allow strikes in the public sector of education. However, new legislation should be enacted that will impose "equal punishment", to include fines and/or imprisonment, on either party for failure to bargain in good faith, respect court ordered injunctions, or comply with an arbitrator's decision. Sixty-one per cent of those responding reported that they were not opposed to a policy of "equal punishment" (see Table 3 and Appendix A).

What may be the most innovative model to emerge as a result of this study is the idea of a permanent committee that would be involved in establishing formal contract guidelines (see Appendix A). In response to a question seeking a solution to impasse and strike, 67 per cent (see Table 3) favored the idea of creating a permanent committee, consisting of members representing the Board of Regents, the faculty and administration of each institution, and of the bargaining agencies. The committee would be responsible for (a) reviewing the demands that both sides are planning to submit for formal contract negotiation, and (b) to publicize the recommended agenda.

The major advantages of such a procedure would be the elimination of "frill" items and other extraneous demands inserted, in many cases, for the purpose of "trade-off" or to prolong negotiations in order to gain public sympathy and support in the event of an impasse or strike. Such delaying tactics often become a battle for the minds and the hearts of the public.

While the advantages of campus unionization and the high expectations of faculty members are real, there does exist the danger of outside interest groups becoming involved in campus decisionmaking. The fragmentation of power and the "proliferation of bosses" could pose a serious problem and possibly lead to a "multiple adversary system" in which many

of the adversaries may go directly to whomever may influence bargaining. Such practices will only serve to increase the system's dependence on the political process (Kemerer and Baldrige, p. 174).

While this fear is reflected by a majority of campus presidents and department chairpersons in the Kemerer and Baldrige study, less than a majority of the respondents of this study share this fear (see question 2.15, Table 7). Both groups of the Kemerer and Baldrige study are of the opinion that campus unionization can result in a transfer of power to noncampus personnel, and that arbitrators and courts will play a greater role in campus decisionmaking. Kemerer and Baldrige conclude that in such an environment "education becomes a product of negotiation rather than deliberation" (p. 139).

In analyzing the reasons for campus unionization, a factor which can not be ignored is the inability of internal organizations (faculty senate, concourse, groups,) to advance the cause of faculty, resolve faculty problems and grievance issues, or relieve deeply felt frustrations. The lack of success of such internal organizations has caused many teachers to look on collegiality as a myth, and has helped advance the cause of unionism in the three public colleges in Rhode Island (see Table 2). An example of such an organization is the Rhode Island Junior College Faculty Concourse which, today, for all practical purposes is nonexistent.

Another possible factor which can act as an incentive to unionize an institution is the pettiness as well as the lack of foresight of many administrators to meet the changing conditions of the 1970's. In the opinion of Kemerer and Baldridge, administrators, in an effort to meet the demands of higher authority, "are more inclined to disregard faculty recommendations" (p. 47). In more cogent terms, they state: "They must learn to rise above petty hostilities and arbitrary actions that ... characterized initial reactions ... against unionism" (p. 229). Administrators have not evinced much enthusiasm for faculty unions.

The emphasis that administrators have placed on cost-cutting and new accountability practices has resulted in confusion, resentment, and organized resistance (Cheit, 1973, p. 2), and has motivated teachers to turn to unions with high expectations of success (see Table 2).

When administrators and high state officials refuse to face reality as to the need to set the example in fiscal responsibility, it is difficult for faculty-union members to rationalize the need for cost-cutting and accountability practices. In a recently publicized controversial action, a state appointed autonomous commission granted other politically appointed petty bureaucrats under their control pay increases totaling 12 per cent (Providence Journal-Bulletin, November 18, 1976, p. 1), in addition to a previous increase of ten

per cent, while other state employees had to be satisfied with an average increase of 4.5 per cent (Providence Journal-Bulletin, November 20, 1976, p. 5).

This behavior, as well as a blatant statement made by one of the appointed bureaucrats, "I could care less about other state employees," (Providence Journal, November 18, 1976, p. 1), raises some very serious questions about the sincerity and veracity of state elected officials or their appointees to adhere to sound fiscal policies and the need for cost-cutting.

Union members interpret such political maneuvering and attitude as cavalier and as an arrogant disregard for propriety and for the concern of other state employees. Such selfish behavior and attitude help to motivate the growth of unionism, and the belief of faculty in the need for collective action through a strong union to press their demands and protect their rights. Yet, in response to the question "Fiscal responsibility for appropriating funds for education should be the responsibility of an independent State agency authorized to adjust taxes for educational purposes," (see question 2.29 Appendix C) the respondents voted three to one against such an agency (see Table 3, and Table 7).

While there seems to be considerable agreement among the selected sample concerning matters of economic benefits, job security, power, and determination to bargain collectively (see Table 2), there is less agreement regarding the withholding of services and a concern for professionalism. Union

leaders are inclined to view this "concern for increasing professionalism" as "one cause for unionism" (Kemerer and Baldrige, p. 125). Although 63 per cent no longer see strike as a nonprofessional action (see Table 2), 54 per cent of the respondents still consider the withholding of services as violating professional values and as reflecting nonprofessional conduct (see Table 3).

The concern of respondents about withholding services is also revealed in their responses to related questions about voluntary mediation. While 68 per cent felt that they would favor such voluntary action (third party neutral), only 61 per cent indicated that they would prefer continued negotiations rather than conduct a work stoppage (see Table 3).

It is also interesting to note that a majority of the selected sample (54 per cent) believe that faculty unionism has given added protection to the unproductive and mediocre faculty (see Table 4). Kemerer and Baldrige share a similar view about the relationship of unionism and the protection of incompetent faculty. They conclude that the protectionist job security orientation of faculty unions is a negative consequence of faculty unionism that could give protection to the incompetent (p. 128).

The significance of the statistical data and the attitudes of the respondents is that even though they view a strike action as a legitimate form of sanction to achieve faculty aims, there is still some reluctance and very sincere

doubt about the propriety of withholding services, as well as a deep concern about maintaining not only high professional ethical standards, but also about providing quality education.

The general conclusion that can be drawn from the completed results of this study is that a majority of the selected sample possess favorable attitudes towards the use of collective negotiations in the public schools of higher education in Rhode Island. In fact, given a choice, 75 per cent indicated that they would vote once again for a union. Only 15 per cent responded that they would vote against all unions, and of the remaining 10 per cent of the respondents, 8 per cent said that they would abstain and 2 per cent chose not to answer.

A second generalization that can be made is that a majority of the selected sample is still concerned about the professional image of the faculty and the use of the strike as an ultimate sanction. The majority would prefer continued negotiation with a third (neutral) party. The third general conclusion is that the respondents are sincerely concerned about the quality of education, an aspect of faculty unionism that has not been fully understood or appreciated by the public sector.

In dealing with factors that the respondents have reported as causes for unionism and impasse leading to strike, management must assign priorities to these areas of concern and do what they can to eliminate or minimize the most critical and divisive factors. On the other hand, unions as well as the judiciary, must face the reality of the ultimate cost

and of the responsibility of elected officials to the taxpayer to maintain fiscal stability. In the final analysis, the acceptable answers to these concerns would be the difference between impasse or strike or no strike.

How will unionism in the public institutions of higher education in Rhode Island fare in the future? Dr. Fred Burke, a former Commissioner of Education in Rhode Island, predicts almost universal acceptance in the next decade in both the public and private sectors (Burke, 1973, p. 2). The pattern it takes and the model which will prevail in Rhode Island will be determined by the measures that administrators, Board of Regents, and legislators take to deal with the demands and desires of faculty, and by the aggressiveness of the faculty and union officials.

As a final point, while this investigator feels that much needed and valuable data were collected through the use of the present questionnaire model, there should be some specific changes made in both format and wording before it is used again. It is believed that the questionnaire's value as a data collecting instrument would be enhanced by 1) reducing the amount of demographic information sought, and the number of questions asked, 2) simplifying section headings and instructions for ease of answering, and 3) revising and keying the format for ease of computerization.

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
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APPENDIX A
Chart 1. Collective Negotiation Procedures*



¹ Faculty strike is legal when management rejects request for binding arbitration, or does not comply with the provisions of either arbitration or of court injunction.

² Faculty strike is illegal when faculty rejects binding arbitration, or does not comply with the provisions of either binding arbitration or of court injunction.

³ Both negotiating parties are subject to equal punishment (fines or jail terms) for the non-compliance of the provisions of either binding arbitration or of court injunction.

64 * Sources: Morgan, D.A. ERIC REPORTS. ED 088 552, JC 740 106, January 1974, 6. See also Nardone, Henry J. "The Regent's Plan And Other Ideas." In Sidney B. Rollins, (Ed.), Teacher Negotiation And Solutions To Impasse Presentations. Rhode Island College, February 1976, 6-7.

APPENDIX B
PLEASE HELP!

Dear Friend:

I am presently participating in a graduate research project in educational leadership. One of the course requirements is to write a research paper involving people who by virtue of elected, appointed, or professional responsibility have a voice in setting educational policy. The topic of my study is Unionism and Collective Bargaining in the Public Institutions of Higher Education in Rhode Island.

The purpose of this project is to examine the impact of both on the academic governance and relationships of administration and faculty of the institutions under study, and to, hopefully, gain an insight into specific means for resolving or minimizing institutional conflicts. Included in the study will be members of the academic community, the Board of Regents, union officials, and those officials and individuals in the public sector involved in the development of educational policies and/or their implementation.

The questionnaire is organized for quick answering and can be completed in approximately 15 to 20 minutes. To keep your answers to this questionnaire anonymous. PLEASE DO NOT SIGN IT. But, please reply by April 12, 1976. Inclosed is a return-addressed envelope provided for your convenience.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,
Anthony Masi

APPENDIX C

CONFIDENTIAL QUESTIONNAIRE

PLEASE DO NOT SIGN

All responses will be strictly confidential, and no individual response will be released.

I. College or school affiliation - list only primary appointment.

Check one. URI (), RIC (), RIJC (), Other (Specify) _____

A. Faculty - Non-faculty Rank (Check one).

1. Professor (), 2. Assoc. Prof. (), 3. Ass't Prof. (),
4. Instructor (), 5. Other (Specify)_____.

B. Faculty - Non-faculty Status (Check one).

1. Full Time Tenured (), Non-tenured ().
2. Part Time (). 3. Other (Specify)_____.

C. Administration (Administrators, Staff, etc.) (Check one).

1. Top Official (President, Vice-President) ().
2. Dean/Director (of College, of Study, of Program) ().
3. Department Head ().
4. Staff ().

D. Years of employment (Check one).

- 1-5 (), 6-10 (), 11-20 (), Over 20 ().

E. Union or Association Affiliation (Check one).

1. AAUP (), NEA (), AFT (), Other (Specify)_____.
2. Labor Union Official (). 3. Labor Union Staff ().
4. Elected Officer (President, Vice-Pres., etc.) ().
5. Executive Committee (). 6. Other (Specify)_____.

II. Affiliation with other agencies, organizations, etc.

A. Board of Regents (Check one).

1. Member of Board Full Time (), Part Time ().
2. Staff Employee Full Time (), Part Time ().

B. State/Local Government, Agency, Branch, etc. (Check one).

1. Legislative ().
2. Judiciary ().
3. Special Study Committee (Specify)_____.
4. Other (Specify)_____.

III. Academic Background: Highest degree earned (Check one).

1. Bachelor or less ().
2. Masters ().
3. Above Masters (M.D., LL.B., Ph.D. Ed., or equivalent) ().
4. Other (Specify)_____.

IV. Employment Background (Check one).

A. When did you enter your present field, area, or profession?

1. Directly from school (Check one). Yes (). No ().
2. After 1-3 Yrs(), 4-8 Yrs(), 9-15 Yrs(), Over 15 ().

B. If from other than school (Check one).

1. From Industry ().
2. From Business ().
3. From Military ().
4. From Government (State/Fed.) ().
5. Other (Specify)_____.

V. Sex (Check one).

1. Male ().
2. Female ().

VI. Age (Check one).

1. Under 25 ().
2. 26-30 ().
3. 31-35 ().
4. 36-40 ().
5. 41-50 ().
6. Over 50 ().

VII. Affiliation with educational negotiations and/or process.

1. Have you ever been a member of a negotiation committee?

Check one. Yes (). No ().

2. If Yes. When? (Specify)_____.

UNIONISM AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

In the blank space to the left of each item, please indicate your opinion about faculty unionism, militancy (the determination to strike if necessary), and the issues leading to impasse and strike by using the following number code.

1 Strongly Agree 2 Agree With Reservation 3 Strongly Disagree 4 Disagree With Reservation 5 No Opinion

Section I. Unionism and Militancy on college campuses is due to:

- _____ 1.1 Desire for increased benefits (wages and fringe).
- _____ 1.2 Fear of budget cuts (concern for job opportunities).
- _____ 1.3 Desire to negotiate job security.
- _____ 1.4 Pro-union sentiment of faculty.
- _____ 1.5 Influx of young, aggressive faculty.
- _____ 1.6 Outdated State and local fiscal (tax) policies/laws.
- _____ 1.7 Existing tenure policies and/or quotas.
- _____ 1.8 Unilateral administrative decisions over personnel.
- _____ 1.9 Faculty desire for more say in academic governance.
- _____ 1.10 Unsatisfactory grievance procedures.
- _____ 1.11 Excessive administrative bureaucracy.
- _____ 1.12 Organizing efforts of State/National labor unions.
- _____ 1.13 Desire of faculty to preserve own economic power and job.
- _____ 1.14 Lack of faculty confidence in the merit system.
- _____ 1.15 Difficulty of qualified, competent teachers to gain promotions and/or salary increases without resorting to collective action and/or bargaining.
- _____ 1.16 Philosophical differences concerning the values and purposes of education.
- _____ 1.17 State and federal laws granting collective bargaining rights to public employees.
- _____ 1.18 Fiscal dependence of management (Board of Regents, etc.) on other elected officials or agencies.
- _____ 1.19 Freezing of aid to education.
- _____ 1.20 Equalization of salaries within the college system.
- _____ 1.21 Restraints on the scope of collective bargaining.
- _____ 1.22 Working conditions (Contact hours, Class size).
- _____ 1.23 Difficulty of faculty to gain influence on campus without resorting to collective action.

- _____ 1.24 Failure of Faculty Senate/Concourse, etc., to gain adequate results/benefits, etc.
- _____ 1.25 Introduction of cost-cutting and accountability policies.
- _____ 1.26 Activist members of the faculty advocating militancy.
- _____ 1.27 Faculty no longer see strikes as non-professional.
- _____ 1.28 Refusal of management to share authority.
- _____ 1.29 Guidance and assistance of union organizers.
- _____ 1.30 Political support from public officials and office-seekers.
- _____ 1.31 Determination of faculty to bargain collectively for their own interests.

Section II. This section is to ascertain your opinion of those factors which could bring about impasse and/or strike, and of possible solutions that might provide specific means to minimize or eliminate labor disputes in education.

- _____ 2.1 Anti-strike injunctions tend to reinforce strike sentiment.
- _____ 2.2 Rejection of demands for increase in salary.
- _____ 2.3 Refusal of one and/or both sides to negotiate.
- _____ 2.4 Restraints on negotiating budget matters.
- _____ 2.5 Current labor laws are ineffective and ambiguous.
- _____ 2.6 Bad faith negotiation by one and/or both sides.
- _____ 2.7 Negotiations involving faculty retrenchment/reduction.
- _____ 2.8 Negotiation of an excessive number of issues for purpose of "trade-off".
- _____ 2.9 Specific issues to be negotiated should be agreed on before the start of negotiations.
- _____ 2.10 Greater recognition by management of the right-to-strike might avoid the use of the strike as an ultimate weapon.
- _____ 2.11 Collective bargaining issues should be "spelled-out" by State legislation.
- _____ 2.12 Specific legislation should be enacted to impose fines and/or imprisonment on either party equally for failure to comply with an arbitrator's decision.
- _____ 2.13 Administrators should have ultimate authority for establishing guidelines governing institutional organization and governance.

- _____ 2.14 The faculty should be given the responsibility for establishing academic policy and standards.
- _____ 2.15 Campus unionization has resulted in faculty rights and professional responsibilities being surrendered to union officials, organizers, and non-campus personnel.
- _____ 2.16 Taxes for education should be fixed by State law.
- _____ 2.17 The State should assume the full cost of education.
- _____ 2.18 The withholding of faculty services violate professional values and reflect non-professional conduct.
- _____ 2.19 Court injunctions, mandating a return to work, should be enforced.
- _____ 2.20 Congress should enact strict and enforceable guidelines for collective bargaining in education.
- _____ 2.21 A permanent committee, consisting of professional representatives from the Board of Regents, the faculty, and the college administration should be established to review issues to be negotiated in future contracts.
- _____ 2.22 Collective negotiations should start early enough to permit a meaningful input before budgets are passed.
- _____ 2.23 Collective negotiations should start at least 150 days before the end of the school year.
- _____ 2.24 Both parties should continue to negotiate without resorting to a work-stoppage in the event of an 'impasse'.
- _____ 2.25 In the event of an impasse, both parties should resort to voluntary binding arbitration (third party neutral).
- _____ 2.26 In the event of an impasse, both parties should resort to mandatory mediation (third party decision).
- _____ 2.27 In the event of an impasse, both parties should resort to the last best offer "total package (third party decision).
- _____ 2.28 In the event of an impasse, both parties should resort to the last best offer "item by item" (third party decision).
- _____ 2.29 Fiscal responsibility for appropriating funds for education should be the responsibility of an independent State agency authorized to adjust taxes for educational purposes.

Section III. This section deals with how you perceive the impact of faculty unionization on academic governance.
Please continue to use the same code as above.

Faculty Unionism has:

- _____ 3.1 Increased the power of faculty in academic governance.
- _____ 3.2 Decreased the power of management.

- _____ 3.3 Destroyed the concept of collegiality/shared authority.
- _____ 3.4 Made teachers more independent.
- _____ 3.5 Increased the formal relationship between faculty and administrators.
- _____ 3.6 Given faculty added academic freedom.
- _____ 3.7 Not changed the power relationship between faculty and management.
- _____ 3.8 Given added protection to the unproductive and mediocre faculty.
- _____ 3.9 Increased the power of State agencies (Board of Regents).
- _____ 3.10 Formalized relationships and created feelings of antagonism between some members of the faculty.
- _____ 3.11 Caused faculty to lose status in the eyes of the public.
- _____ 3.12 Enhanced the relationship between faculty and student.

Section IV. If a vote were held today for a bargaining agent, "HOW WOULD YOU VOTE". Please check one.

- 1. For a union - AAUP (), NEA (), AFT ().
- 2. Against all unions ().
- 3. Abstain ().

Section V. If you voted for a union or voted to abstain and were given a choice. "HOW WOULD YOU VOTE". Please check one.

- 1. Exclusive "system-wide" (URI, RIC, RIJC) collective bargaining representation by a majority collective bargaining agent elected by the faculty of the three schools ().
- 2. Representation by a confederation of and/or unification of: Please check one.
 - a. All three bargaining agencies ().
 - b. AAUP and AFT ().
 - c. AAUP and NEA ().
 - d. NEA and AFT ().
- 3. No change from Section IV above.

Section VI. Please use this section to make any additional comments. Thank you once again. Your input will be of value.

APPENDIX D
RHODE ISLAND JUNIOR COLLEGE
WARWICK, RHODE ISLAND

Dear

Recently, I distributed a questionnaire which I am using to formulate a report entitled Unionism and Collective Bargaining in the Public Institutions of Higher Education in Rhode Island. This was one of the requirements for a course on educational leadership in which I am enrolled.

If you have returned the questionnaire, thank you very much for your cooperation and your valued input. If you have not, PLEASE take a few moments to do so. Your input is of value and will ensure a balanced input from the academic personnel of the three public institutions (URI, RIC, RIJC) under study, from other areas of the public sector (Board of Regents, Legislature, Judiciary), as well as from officers and officials of the three associations (AAUP, AFT, RINEA).

Thank you once again for your help.

Sincerely yours,

Anthony Masi
Social Science Dept.
RIJC (Warwick Campus)